I Introduction
While corporate boards, audit committees and remuneration committees have been subject to extensive analysis and research, one of the most important elements of corporate governance has been largely disregarded: the nomination committee.
The reason why it has been neglected is that it is perceived as falling between stools.
In the widely dispersed ownership systems of the UK and US, the nomination committee is an organ of the board, and shareholders for the most part rubber-stamp the recommendations of the committee. In contrast, in the concentrated ownership systems of Continental Europe and the Far East, the dominant shareholders are able to exert so much control that a nomination committee is largely irrelevant -the large shareholders appoint at will. The nomination committee is therefore decisive or irrelevant. Either way it is not very interesting. This paper suggests that, on the contrary, the nomination committee (NC) should be a primary focus of attention in corporate governance debates. The reason is that, when used in a right way, it plays a fundamental role in the appointment and removal of board members and is a key determinant of the composition of boards and corporate performance. If companies make the right initial appointments then much else follows; if they do not then no other aspect of corporate governance -monitoring, measurement or incentives -can fully rectify the damage. Thus, the legitimacy of the NC in the eyes of the shareholder community and the trust received from minority shareholders is pivotal to the empowerment of the board.
In particular, the NC is critical to concerns about the ownership of companies and the engagement of institutional investors in active oversight and monitoring of management. It will be suggested that the NC can be instrumental in both promoting the type of large, longterm shareholdings that are a prerequisite to effective institutional engagement and a means by which that engagement is exercised. Furthermore they provide a basis for resolving potential conflicts that arise between different shareholders, most notably between dominant and minority shareholders.
The paper will do this by contrasting the operation of NCs in two countries: Sweden and the UK. These two countries are particularly interesting because Nasdaq Stockholm and London Stock Exchange (LSE) both pride themselves in being at the forefront of Europe's most liberalized and active market economies, based predominantly on self-regulation as against legal statute. Both countries embody what is termed "shareholder primacy", namely legal, regulatory and institutional structures that privilege shareholders over the interests of other parties, and both countries have a substantial presence of institutional investors as well as national pension funds. They therefore stand in contrast to several other Continental European countries and many other parts of the rest of the world where shareholder interests receive less prominence in relation to that of other parties to the firm. They are in this respect similar to other common law countries, such as the US, and the analysis reported here has relevance to them too.
While therefore similar in many respects, the nature of the two countries' NCs are very different. In the UK, the NC is an internal committee of the board on which independent members sit and nominate successor members of the board. In Sweden it is an external committee in which shareholders play an important role in the selection process. The internal system of the UK delegates the nomination of new members of the board to its non-executive members. In Sweden, on the other hand, the nomination process resides with representatives of shareholders themselves.
As will be described below, in general Swedish companies have large controlling shareholders who have incentives to exert significant influence over the nomination process, As a consequence, by giving them a presence on the NC, its nomination process encourages their direct engagement in the appointment process and mitigates the shareholder disengagement problems that afflict the UK internal system. On the other hand, it does this at the expense of creating another problem, namely potential divergences of interests between different types of shareholders, notably between large, well-informed and small, uninformed, shareholders.
As we will see, differences in the nature of ownership and norms of governance explain much of the difference in operation of NCs in the two countries. Understanding the way in which NCs operate in Sweden and the UK is therefore fundamental to an appreciation of the merits and deficiencies of different forms of capitalism as reflected in their ownership and governance of firms. Growing societal pressure on institutional investors to undertake engaged responsible corporate governance (as proposed by, for example, the Kay Review, 2012 and the EU Shareholders' Rights Directive, 2014/17) strengthens expectations about the role of NCs in corporate governance (the UK Stewardship Code, 2012; Lipton, World Economic Forum, 2016) . This paper asks the questions whether the UK system would benefit from having more engagement by institutional investors in the nomination process and an external rather than an internal NC and would Sweden be advised to reduce the power of dominant shareholders in the nomination process and create a greater level of independence of NCs from large shareholders?
To address these questions, we examine how the institutional corporate governance settings of Sweden and the UK work to empower institutional investors through the NC. The paper draws on a mixture of academic research, legal documents and official as well as semiofficial reports. These sources show how ownership has evolved since the 1980s until now and the relevance of company law in defining the role of independent directors. The paper draws on novel research showing how Swedish institutional investors have begun to take larger stakes in investee companies that are evaluated over longer time horizons than was previously the case (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2017) . In the process, institutional investors engage in the NC on a longer-term basis, collaborating both with controlling shareholders and other long-term institutional investors. There are advantages to this in addressing agency problems but at the expense of the independence of the nomination process from influence by particular shareholders. We discuss the possibility of achieving superior outcomes by combining features of the Swedish and UK nomination process.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the legal and regulatory background to NCs in Sweden and the UK. We then discuss the theoretical underpinning of NCs in section 3. In sections 4 and 5, we contrast the operation of NCs and institutional investors in Sweden and the UK. Finally, we draw conclusions and propose policy recommendations in section 6.
The Swedish and UK governance systems
The UK choice of internal and the Swedish of external NCs is a reflection of their respective corporate governance, takeover and stewardship codes, and their companies acts and, stock exchange listing rules. A summary of relevant soft and hard laws, listing requirements and regulations, including how they have altered over time, is provided in the Appendix.
Both countries have company acts that state that the board of directors owe fiduciary duties to promote the success of their companies for the benefit of their shareholders. In both systems, shareholders vote on director nominees at the annual general meeting (AGM) and can propose their own directors. In both countries, the NC is part of a self-regulatory system, based on the principle of comply or explain, set out in their respective corporate governance codes -the Swedish and UK corporate governance codes. Both countries observe a high degree of compliance with their governance codes (Lekvall, 2013; Davies, 2015) .
However, the countries differ in regard to shareholder influence on board composition and enrolment, the composition of the NCs, how votes are exercised by the shareholders at the AGM, and their attitudes towards shareholder collaboration. The countries also differ in their approach to reflecting the interests of minority shareholders in the nomination process. 
The Swedish NC
Swedish and Nordic corporate governance are based on a two-tier board with separation between the organs of the corporation: (i) the shareholders at the AGM: (ii) the board of directors, and (iii) the chief executive officer (CEO) and management. The Companies Act grants a single shareholder or group of shareholders controlling 50 per cent of the votes at the AGM the right to nominate all the directors of the board. The influence of large shareholders can be intensified through multiple voting shares (Series A shares assigned 10 votes and B shares assigned 1 vote), and over half of listed companies in Sweden have multiple voting stocks (Lekvall, 2014) , despite there being a trend to initial public offerings (IPOs) with just one class of shares. Only one executive can be elected to the board, usually the CEO and approximately half of listed company boards do not include the CEO (Lekvall, 2008) .
The Swedish Corporate Governance Code reflects the dual responsibilities of directors in the Companies Act. The Code distinguishes between directors being independent of the company and large shareholders (defined as owning more than 10 per cent of capital and votes) and recommends that at least two directors be independent of both the company and large shareholders. No more than 50 per cent of the directors are permitted to have had a relationship with the company (e.g. as a recent employee, customer or financial institution). In addition, Swedish co-determination allows two directors to be nominated by the workers' unions, usually one from each of blue and white-collar unions. The NC is appointed by shareholders at an general meeting or during the course of the year (Carlsson 2007; Lekvall, 2008) .
To avoid the NC being entirely dominated by a controlling shareholder, the Code requires that at least one member of the committee be independent of the largest shareholder.
A typical NC will comprise one or two representatives of the controlling shareholder, the chair (who is often associated with the controlling shareholder) and two or three institutional investors. These are in general Swedish since foreign institutions usually decline offers to participate in the NC (Ehne, 2014) . A representative of small investors is sometimes invited to join the NC but this is unusual. It is common for the NC to comprise members representing 15 to 20 per cent of shares outstanding, which often is enough to control a majority of the votes at the AGM, particularly if the shares have multiple voting rights attached to them.
The UK NC
NCs became commonplace after the British Cadbury report on corporate governance was published in 1992.
3 UK corporate governance is based on a one-tier board structure. The UK Companies Act allows boards to be made up of a mixture of inside (the CEO and other executives) and outside non-executive directors (NEDs). At least half the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise NEDs who are regarded by the board as independent in having no relation with the company or its related parties and not having served on the board for a period exceeding nine years. Exceptions are made for smaller companies, where there should be at least two independent NEDs. 4 Nominations to the board are made by a NC, which is a sub-committee of the main board. The NC is required to comprise a majority of independent
NEDs with the chairman of the board or an independent NED acting as its chair.
The NC is an important component of corporate governance in both the UK and Sweden and we turn now to its theoretical underpinnings to understand how it addresses two sets of issues: (a) conflicts between minority shareholders and management in the UK and between large and small shareholders in Sweden and (b) long-term relationships between shareholders and management.
Theoretical underpinning of the NC
The traditional view of the governance of the firm is based on the agency problems that exist between shareholders and management. Adam Smith (1776) discussed the board's role in mitigating information asymmetries between shareholders and management. Ronald Coase (1937) identified the value of empowering the corporate form with a central decision-making body, substituting entrepreneurial fiat for the price mechanism of the market.
Success is expected to lead to a board that both contributes to corporate value creation and lower capital costs. Since the beginning of the 1980s the conventional view has been that corporate value creation is evaluated in terms of shareholder wealth, and the board exists to monitor, advise and contribute to strategy formation to enhance shareholder value. For minority shareholders, it is both cheaper and rational to transfer decision-making to a smaller and informed body with authority (Banbridge, 2015) 5 -hence the "duty of loyalty" in company law.
The "agency-problem" is then defined as aligning the interests of board and managers with those of their external shareholders, to avoid unprofitable growth or undue complacency (Berle and Means, 1932/1968; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . However, the agency-problem can also be related to conflicting interests between a large block holder, with active participation on the board, and minority shareholders with both less influence and information giving rise to the principal-principal conflict (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981/1991; Burkart and Panunzi, 2008) . Minority shareholders need specific protection to ensure that the board is accountable to all shareholders, i.e. that there are limits to the ability of large shareholders to divert wealth to themselves.
The shareholder primary model has been questioned in many contexts (i.e. Stout, 2012; Mayer, 2015) . According to these critiques, corporate governance is about "ensuring that the corporation abides by its stated purpose, values and principles". 6 Consequently the board's role should focus on creating value in the interest of the corporation itself, its employees, stakeholders, including shareholders and society. This focus of the board's function moves away from the agency view to team production theory Huse, 2007) .
Research shows that long-term committed owners have great influence on corporate governance. Almost all Nordic companies have a strong owner who is supported in law Lekvall, 2013) . Studying Danish foundations, Hansmann and Thomsen (2012) find a correlation between value creation and support of long-term committed industrial foundations. However, strong ownership is by no means always successful and it is not clear how much of the success of the Nordic corporate model is attributable to the high trust nature of Nordic societies, i.e. small country effects (Sinani et al. 2008 ). In the case of Sweden, it might just be that respect for large owners, passive support from minority
institutional investors and what is perceived to be a healthy relationship with both the state and labor unions have allowed Sweden to develop profitable, well-run companies (Henrekson and Bergh, 2013) .
Most jurisdictions formulate the director's fiduciary duty as being accountable to the company and/or shareholders as a whole. This puts the long-term owner-perspective centre stage rather than the interests of either current short-term shareholders or management.
However, the role of the NC differs appreciably between Nordic countries and the UK and US.
The Nordic model embraces shareholder nominated directors on the board, including representatives of large shareholders. All Nordic jurisdictions allow owners controlling 50 per cent of the votes at the AGM to enroll all shareholder-nominated board members. The
Swedish external NC offers all owners a forum to discuss governance issues and to enter a dialogue with the company. Collaboration and concerted activities among shareholders, including institutional investors, are encouraged. A number of studies of the Swedish capital market suggest that conflicts between large and small shareholders have overall been kept at a low level, trust between majority and minority shareholders in general being high (Gilson, 2006; Sinani et al. 2008; Lekvall, 2014) . In contrast, the UK and US have stock markets dominated by dispersed ownership and companies acts that empower management-led boards. In the US, the board comprises a mixture of internal and external directors empowered to interpret their fiduciary duty to protect long-term interest of the company. Board enrolment is an internal matter, with the NC part of the board and in the control of the chair, the vice chair and the CEO. In the postfinancial crisis era, a number of companies have been pressed by their shareholders to change their by-laws to facilitate enrolment of shareholder nominated directors. The UK Companies Act does empower the General assembly to suggest directors (just as in Sweden) but shareholders seldom take action. British governance views large shareholders as stakeholders with specific interests rather than those of shareholders as a whole. Thus the Companies Act therefore supports the presence of non-executives on the board but a board composed of only independent NEDs would turn into a pure monitor (Davies, 2015) . To balance the different roles of directors, the Companies Act requires a mixture of internal and external (independent) directors. The UK corporate governance code states that a NC should be composed of a majority of independent directors and recommends that only one representative for a large owner be elected.
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Legal scholars highlight that corporate governance codes, including the original British Cadbury rules, are unclear about the definition of "independent directors". Hansen (2013) draws on the Nordic governance experience to argue that independent directors all too often fail to monitor and discipline management. Independent directors that are independent of both the company and owners do not solve the governance problem; instead Hansen claims that governance should recognize the importance of active owners. 9 An extensive study of board work in 36 large Nordic companies shows that dominant shareholders in general do not appreciate the work of the NC and handle the enrolment of the most significant directors outside of the NC.
There is no evidence of significant performance effects from the presence of independent directors on company boards (Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al. 2010) . Examining the rise of independent directors as a legal transplant from jurisdictions with dispersed ownership to other systems in which controlled corporations are dominant, Ferrarini and Filippelli (2015) show that countries use different definitions of, and assign different powers to independent directors of dispersed ownership and controlled companies. The external NC model was also inspired by Swedish popular movements 11 The original proposal from the Shareholders Association was to have shareholders setting up NCs at AGMs, with public exposure to shareholders providing accountability to large and small shareholders. To ensure the NCs independence from large owners at least one member was required to be independent of any large shareholder or shareholders working in collaboration.
(Chapter 2 §3). Between 2005 and 2010 the notion of independent directors was part of the Nasdaq Stockholm's listing requirements but it was removed in 2010.
The Cadbury Committee in the UK stated in 1992 that a majority of directors should be independent of the company where independence was defined as being free from any business or other relations that might materially interfere with their exercise of independent judgment. NEDs were to be selected through a formal process with the support of a nomination committee and both this process and their appointment was to be a matter for the board as a whole, thereby limiting risk of stakeholder influence (1992: 4.10-4.17). Reelection was to be at least every third year. In the preparatory work of the Cadbury code consideration was given to the idea that shareholders should be more closely involved in the appointment of directors and auditors through the formation of "shareholders' committees".
However, this was ruled out: "…as we have not seen evidence explaining how it would be possible to form shareholder committees in such a way that they would be both truly representative of all the company's shareholders and able to keep in regular touch with their changing constituencies. Unless these tests of legitimacy are met, the Committee is unable to see how shareholder committees can become the accepted link between a board and its shareholders." (Section Accountability to the Shareholders. 6.3).
The British and Swedish institutional investors in the NC
British and Swedish domestic institutional investors' play an important role in legitimizing the NC as a corporate governance device. Traditionally, there has been a home-bias in domestic institutional investments with 30 to 50 percent of equity portfolios being allocated to domestic stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Dahlquist et al, 2003) . Despite the theoretical merits of global diversification, quantitative limits in many countries (Yermo, 2008; ) and a preference for exit over voice despite an increasing concentration of stakes (Jackson, 2008) , investing in the home market continues in both the UK and Sweden and is supported by claimed benefits such as better information, lower asset management costs, and lower transaction costs (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Dahlquist et al. 2003 ).
The role of Swedish institutional investors
Swedish institutional investor influence on the stock market has changed recently (Table 1) .
In 1990, the year before Sweden opened up for foreign direct investments on the stock exchange, Swedish institutional investors such as the four large Swedish National Pension Until the end of the financial boom in 2008, Swedish institutional investors, when they participated in nomination committees, acted passively, either supporting larger shareholders (Hellman, 2005) or selling during takeovers (Kallifatides et al 2010; Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012 where media campaigns were highly effective. 12 Nevertheless, domestic institutions clearly embrace the model (Lekvall, 2008; Tomorrow's Company, 2016) .
The role of the UK institutional investor
The general picture of UK as a fully dispersed shareholder regime, with atomized shareholders having large costs for coordination, is not correct (Davies, 2015) . 
Engagement by Swedish institutional investors
A number of studies show that the Swedish version of an external NC has had substantial impact on shareholder engagement in the nomination process, increased confidence in the board function and encouraged shareholders to become more involved (Poulsen, Strand and Thomsen, 2010) . Building on comparative material from institutional investor activities and proxy statements at the AGMs in Denmark and Sweden, Hannes and Strand (2013) (Hannes and Strand, 2013) . Also, the "old boys network" has clearly been broken (Björkmo, 2008) .
Domestic institutional investors have enhanced the recruitment of female board members. There are more females among the independent directors than among the owner dependent directors (AP2, 2016). Since institutions are only involved in the enrolment of independent directors, this indicates that engagement of institutional investors on the NC has had a strong gender effect (Table 3 ). Other studies claim that institutional investors in NCs have played a particular role in director enrolment in small and medium sized companies, where executives and owners often lack access to a network of relevant qualified people (Grönberg and Kallifatides, 2012) . This change in investment style has occurred within the current regulatory framework and without an overall increase in portfolio asset exposure to the Swedish stock market. To provide further insight into the rationale for this change in domestic institutional investments, Nachemson-Ekwall (2017) re-conceptualizes their investment strategy using a three-phase framework. In the first phase, broadly the period 1980 to 2000, the collectivization of the Swedish capital market took off and began to move abroad. There were institutional investments with larger stakes, but engagement remained more or less passive (Hellman, 2005) . In the second phase, broadly consisting of the period just before the turn of the millennium and up to the beginning of the post-financial-crisis era, the globalization of capital markets was associated with a focusing of the industry on low-cost benchmarking, index tracking and smaller stakes in each company. (Table 5) . Studies also highlight the concentration of power in the hands of the NC. When the NC only represents 10-15 per cent of the total shareholdings it really lacks legitimacy in the eyes of other minority shareholders (Björkmo, 2008) . The Swedish version of external NC has also difficulty dealing with controlling shareholders that choose not to collaborate with minority shareholders, which could also be institutional investors (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012 In the revised Code 2015 two changes were introduced related to the NC. Rule 2 now states that any person on the NC shall upon acceptance consider possible conflicts of interest. It also demands that the NC considers diversity of directors and works to promote gender equality (Ch. 2 §1). 15 There appears to be a dominance of independent directors educated at a few business schools. Among the independent female board members almost all have a degree from the Stockholm School of Economics. They are all dependent on good relationships with the institutional investors. Integrity is not all that matters when there is a risk of "cold shouldering" creating less opportunities for jobs in the future (Andersson (2013)).
Studying Norwegian female board members, Huse et al (2014) points to the problem with a growing group of female independent directors that have become professionals, aiming to gain board positions rather than display loyalty to a company. Consequently, the quality of independent (female) directors is not assured in the shareholder-led NC.
Foreign institutional investors, such as Vanguard, Blackrock and Capital group abstain from participation on the NC, thus limiting engagement from the international community to a few activist hedge funds. The general reason is that they do not understand the model; there is a language barrier and they are unwilling to devote the necessary time (Ehne, 2014) . The shareholder led NC model, which enrols members on the basis of institutional size, works against private investor participation. This is especially troubling in SMEs that often lack enough institutional capital.
Engagement by British institutional investors
There are few studies on the legitimacy and efficacy of the UK NC. In the FRC report on Corporate Governance and Stewardship published January 2017 it was stated that 90 per cent of FTSE 350 companies report compliance with all, or all but one or two, of its 54 provisions.
A lack of independent directors remained the highest non-compliant provision. There was also a need for nomination committees to have a more active role in the alignment of board composition with company strategy, and to ensure that the board has the necessary skills to promote long-term success of the company (p. 7).
Tomorrow's Corporate Governance (2010) progressively more unclear as it works through intermediaries along the so-called asset-value chain. Institutional investor engagement seems to be more related to specific cases, i.e.
activism and executive remuneration (Edmans, 2014; Becht et al 2009; The Big Innovation Centre, 2016/17) .
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There are concerns that signatories to the Stewardship Code do not abide by it (Wong, 2015) ; there is a general difficulty in evaluating the quality of possible collective engagement by institutions and mandates given to them (FRC, 2011) ; and there are concerns that the UK Stewardship Code ultimately targets a relatively small number of shareholders, as the proportion of UK-listed equity owned by domestic institutional investors has progressively dropped (Cheffins 2010; Davies, 2015) .
Conclusions
The board of director nomination-process is a particularly important but largely ignored aspect of corporate governance. It has been ignored in relation to the attention that has been paid to other corporate governance committees, such as the remuneration and audit committees. Both of these appear to have greater relevance to the financial performance of firms and the correction of managerial failure. EU legislation has addressed both areas.
In actual fact, the nomination process is particularly important because it is a primary determinant of the composition of corporate boards and therefore the functioning and performance of the firm. As custodians of the corporate purpose and firm values, the board plays a critical role in establishing the objectives of the firm and overseeing their implementation through the formulation of strategy, measurement of performance and setting of standards and incentives. The identification of the right members of the board is therefore a primary influence on the operation of the firm.
The comparison of the nomination process in Sweden and the UK has been particularly insightful because of the similarities between the two countries. Both countries place considerable significance on self-regulation and liberalized markets, and on shareholder rights and privileges. Both countries house a large group of domestic institutional investors such as retail funds as well as national and private pensions funds.
However, the differences are as pronounced as the similarities in particular in terms of the presence of block-holders or main shareholders, significant concentrations of shares in Sweden but not in the UK, as well as different approaches in the companies act to blockholders influence on the directors. This has given rise to pronounced variations in the way in which the nomination committees have been structured and operate in the two countries. In Sweden, an external nomination committee provides a forum in which the contrasting views of dominant shareholders about the composition of boards can be resolved.
Rightly used, it is an effective way of encouraging shareholder engagement in the nomination process.
In the UK, the highly dispersed nature of share ownership makes the involvement of shareholders in the nomination process more difficult. There is a serious free rider problem that has given rise to the phenomenon of the "ownerless corporation" in which no investor plays an active governance role (Mayer, 2013) . As a result, instead of engaging shareholders in the nomination process, appointments are an internal process in which (independent) members of the board nominate board members themselves for ratification at shareholder meetings.
The advantage of the UK procedure is that it keeps the nomination process independent of any particular shareholding group and promotes the fair treatment of all shareholders. In the Swedish external nomination process, while there is a requirement on members of the committee to represent the interests of all shareholders, there is an inevitable and unavoidable privileging of those present on the nomination committee. Indeed, some investors regard the fact that appointees inevitably feel a sense of gratitude to those who have appointed them as a potential advantage of building a relation between investors and boards.
The drawback of the UK system is the lack of effective oversight of the nomination process by other parties than the board itself. The members of the board owe a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty to all shareholders and no doubt perform their functions to the best of their abilities but it is essentially an internal self-election process, albeit subject to ratification by shareholders. While the Swedish and UK systems may be regarded as contrasting in terms of their structure and operation, there is no reason why elements of them should not be combined.
Pure external and internal nomination committee can be viewed as lying at two ends of a spectrum in which the nomination process can vary between an external shareholder and internal board determined process. For example, some of the board positions could be nominated by external and other by internal committees. Alternatively, all appointments could be by internal committee as in the UK but with some external shareholder representation and, within both models, collaboration between external and internal parties can be encouraged to ensure the nomination of a cohesive team of directors.
This development has significant implications for the exercise of corporate governance because it provides for both long-term engaged shareholder participation and independent self-appointments by the board. It allows, for example, for lead shareholders to take it in turn to initiate board positions on behalf of other shareholders and benefit themselves from the lead role played by their co-investors in other companies. In other words, a flexible application of internal and external nomination committees may help to address many of the issues associated with free-riding and conflicts of interests in corporate governance while promoting sustainable wealth creation in the interest of the company and its shareholders as a whole.
Appendix A

UK DEVELOPMENT OF HARD LAW COMMENT UK COMPANIES ACT
The duty of loyalty is "to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole" and Companies Act 2006, § 172 have regards to employees, environment, customers and suppliers, society, reputation and fiarness among differnet stakeholders
Companies Act 2006
The board is to be made up of a mixture of inside and outside (non-executive) directors A shareholder may submit a proposal for the nomination of a director candidate if he holds 5 % of the shares of the company. Cleared the independence of a large shareholder, set at 10 %, introduced a 10 year limit for independence The NC to be made up of a majority of independent directors, clearer role for senior independent director Walker Review 2009
Yearly re-election of all directors Relaxation of definition of independence, to enable enrollment of industry-competence
ROLE OF NON EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS NEDs COMMENT NEDs
Defined as independent of the company and an owner that might influence behaviour The Code and Companies Act A senior independent NED is assigned the role to have contact with large shareholders UK CGC 2012: A.4.1
Controlling Shareholders An owner >30 % of votes must sign a "relationship agreement" codifying the relationship to minority shareholders To enhance trust between different groups of shareholders -i.e. large dominating shareholders and minority shareholders -it was possible to include in the company's charter that no single shareholder should be able to vote for more than 20 per cent of the votes present at the AGM.
Companies act 1944 §114-127, p. 348-349.
Companies Act 1975
The chief rule of the stating that no shareholder may vote for more than one-fifth of the shares represented at the meeting, unless otherwise stipulated in the articles of association 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFT LAW
The Swedish external NC Swedish Shareholders Association suggested a Governance Code 1993, with an NC Sweden introduced a CGC 2005 Shareholders can decide on the NC at the AGM or set up a procedure, usually no later than 6 month before the AGM.
The CGC offers different alternatives (CGC Rule 2:2) Smaller shareholders can invite a participant
The AGM structure was suggested by the Swedish Shareholders' association in 19 To provide continuity a member can be asked to stay, even of stocks have been sold 4/5 of the companies apply the Q3 model Member on NC For long the word "representative" has been used, which the CGC corrected in 2008, instead writing "appointed by", CGC 2008 2 § 1 but "representative is still used, partly as a result of th epresence of large owners.
Setup off external NC
Usually the largest 3 or 4 shareholders are invited at the time of the Q3 A majority of its members must be independent of the company At least one member must be independent of the company's largest shareholder or groups of shareholders acting in concert Chair of the board cannot be the chair of the NC, no executives on the NC, CGC Rule 2:3 Directors can participate but only one may be dependent on a major owner A representative of smaller shareholders can be invited to participate To provide continuity a member can be asked to stay, even of stocks have been sold down Shareholders can decide on the NC at the AGM or set up a procedure, usually no later than 6 month before the AGM. 4/5 of the companies apply the Q3 model
ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS Listing requirements
2005-2010 the Nasdaq Stockhlm listing requriement of two from large owners independent directors: Two independent in the Code All listed companies need to follow the code, including comply or explain
Swedish CGC
The majority of the members of the board must be independent of the company At least 2 directors must also be independent of majority owner (defined as owner with +10 % of shares and votes)
Swedish Shareholders Association
Wants to se 3 directors independent of large owners written in the Nasdaq Stockholm listing rules Suggested in the Owner Policy 2017
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS Stewardship Code
Sweden lacks a Stewardship Code. Many have compiled their own code.
Swedish Investment Fund Assoication has a code Limits on voting
The national pensionfunds (SNPF) have a voting cap at 10%. The retail funds have limits, generally viewed to be 10 % too Regulated in law
